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CREATING AN ARTICLE I IMMIGRATION COURT 
Rebecca Baibak* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
“[O]ur Constitution unambiguously enunciates a fundamental 
principle – that the ‘judicial Power of the United States’ must be reposed 
in an independent Judiciary. It commands that the independence of the 
Judiciary be jealously guarded, and it provides clear institutional 
protections for that independence.”1 Despite this fundamental principle, 
today noncitizens are routinely denied independent adjudication because 
the immigration courts and the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) 
are housed in the Department of Justice (“DOJ”), which is directly under 
the Attorney General’s control.2 The Attorney General has exercised this 
control by selecting only immigration adjudicators who agree with his or 
her political opinions3 and by terminating judges who do not agree with 
those political beliefs.4 These displays of power lurk in the back of 
immigration adjudicators’ minds when making decisions. As a result, 
noncitizens are routinely denied their constitutional right to an 
independent judiciary.5  
This comment explores some of the many problems with the current 
immigration adjudication system and advocates that Congress convert 
the immigration courts and the BIA into Article I courts to provide 
noncitizens a truly independent judiciary. Section II, Parts A and B 
examine the current immigration adjudication system and some of its 
many problems. Section II, Parts C and D review the line of Supreme 
Court decisions beginning with Northern Pipeline, which assessed the 
constitutionality of Article I courts, and outlined the structure of a 
current Article I court: the U.S. bankruptcy court. Next, Section III, Part 
A argues that Congress should create Article I immigration courts that, 
like bankruptcy courts, have a trial and appellate division. Last, Section 
III, Part B applies the Northern Pipeline line of decisions and claims, 
first, that federal courts should have greater ability to review 
immigration decisions and, second, that the standard of review in federal 
 
* Associate Member, 2016-2017 University of Cincinnati Law Review. 
 1. N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 60 (1982).    
 2. About the Office, THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (Feb. 9, 2017), 
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/about-office. 
 3. See Stephen H. Legomsky, Fortieth Annual Administrative Law Issue: Immigration Law and 
Adjudication: Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, 59 DUKE L. J. 1635, 1665-1666 (2010).  
 4. Id. at 1669. 
 5. Noncitizens are entitled to due process because the Due Process Clause applies to all 
“person[s]” regardless of their immigration status. Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86 (1903). 
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court should not be deferential to the Article I immigration courts. 
II. BACKGROUND  
Before discussing possible reforms to the immigration adjudication 
system, one must understand the structure of the current arrangement, 
the problems this structure creates, and the constitutionality of 
legislative courts. Part A discusses the organization of the immigration 
adjudication system by following the removal process of a noncitizen 
who asserts asylum as a defense.6 Next, Part B explores some of the 
current immigration court system’s problems including the inherent 
difficulty of immigration cases, disparities in outcomes among 
immigration judges, the mounting backlog on the immigration docket, 
and, most importantly, the Attorney General’s control over the 
immigration adjudication system. Part C examines recent Supreme 
Court decisions that review the constitutionality of legislative courts. 
Last, Part D provides an overview of the bankruptcy courts’ structure, 
an existing legislative court. 
A. The Structure of the Current Immigration Adjudication System 
The removal process begins when the Department of Homeland 
Security (“DHS”) serves a noncitizen a notice to appear before an 
immigration court.7 The DHS is a cabinet-level executive agency that 
enforces immigration laws and provides U.S. immigration benefit 
services.8  
After being served, the noncitizen appears before an immigration 
court. Immigration courts are trial-level courts housed in the DOJ, which 
sit in fifty-seven locations in twenty-eight states.9 Even though 
jurisdiction of the immigration courts spans a wide array of immigration 
related matters, the vast majority of their cases are removal 
 
 6. The comment follows an asylum case because asylum is one of the few types of cases that 
can be appealed all the way up to the federal circuit courts. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 
COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION, JUDICIAL REVIEW BY CIRCUIT COURTS: REFORMING THE 
IMMIGRATION SYSTEM: PROPOSALS TO PROMOTE INDEPENDENCE, FAIRNESS, EFFICIENCY, AND 
PROFESSIONALISM IN THE ADJUDICATION OF REMOVAL CASES 4-9 (2010), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/Immigration/PublicDocuments/full_report_part4
.authcheckdam.pdf, [hereinafter JUDICIAL REVIEW BY CIRCUIT COURTS]. 
 7. Legomsky, supra note 3, at 1641. 
 8. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION: COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION, REFORMING THE 
IMMIGRATION SYSTEM: PROPOSALS TO PROMOTE INDEPENDENCE, FAIRNESS, EFFICIENCY, AND 
PROFESSIONALISM IN THE ADJUDICATION OF REMOVAL CASES 19 (Executive Summary, 2010), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/commission_on_immigration/coi_executive_
summary.authcheckdam.pdf, [hereinafter REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM]. 
 9. Id. at 27. 
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proceedings.10 Whilst under the jurisdiction of the immigration court, 
the noncitizen may seek relief in the form of asylum or withholding of 
removal.11 Alternatively, a noncitizen who is not in a removal 
proceeding can assert an affirmative asylum claim by filing an asylum 
application with the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 
(“USCIS”), which is a component of the DHS.12 If the application is 
granted, the applicant is eligible for permanent resident status.13 But, if 
the application is denied, the asylum applicant is referred to an 
immigration court for removal and the noncitizen can assert asylum as a 
defense.14 Then an immigration judge hears the asylum defense and 
renders a decision.15 If the immigration judge finds the noncitizen has a 
valid asylum defense, then the judge grants asylum.16  
Once the final order is issued, the opposing party may appeal the 
decision to the BIA,17 a seventeen-member appellate-level body18 
housed in the DOJ.19 An appeal to the BIA stays removal orders.20 The 
BIA conducts de novo review of legal issues and reviews facts 
determined by the immigration court under the highly deferential 
“clearly erroneous” standard.21 The BIA may choose to reject the 
asylum claim, remand with instructions, or grant asylum.22   
In an increasingly limited set of circumstances, the noncitizen may 
appeal the BIA decision to a federal court of appeals.23 The noncitizen’s 
ability to appeal to federal courts has dramatically changed in recent 
years.24 Historically, Article III courts could hear immigration cases 
under their habeas corpus jurisdiction.25 The standard of review for facts 
in a habeas petition was “substantial evidence,” meaning the decision 
was only overturned if the facts required a contrary result.26 
 
 10. Id. 
 11. Legomsky, supra note 3, at 1642. 
 12. See, e.g., REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM, supra note 8, at 19. 
 13. Leonard Birdsong, Reforming the Immigration Courts of the United States: Why is There No 
Will to Make It an Article I Court?, 19 BARRY L. REV. 17, 23 (2013).   
 14. Legomsky, supra note 3, at 1642. 
 15. Id. 
 16. See Birdsong, supra note 13, at 23.  
 17. Legomsky, supra note 3, at 1643. 
 18. Christine Lockhart Poarch, Immigration Court Reform: Congress, Heed the Call, FED. 
LAW., Oct.-Nov. 2016, at 10. 
 19. About the Office, supra note 2.  
 20. Legomsky, supra note 3, at 1643. 
 21. Lawrence Baum, Fortieth Annual Administrative Law Issue: Immigration Law and 
Adjudication: Judicial Specialization and the Adjudication of Immigration Cases, 59 DUKE L. J. 1501, 
1513-14 (2010).   
 22. Birdsong, supra note 13, at 25-26. 
 23. Legomsky, supra note 3, at 1643-44. 
 24. See, e.g., JUDICIAL REVIEW BY CIRCUIT COURTS, supra note 6, at 4-5 – 4-9. 
 25. Id. at 4-5. 
 26. Id. at 4-6. 
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Discretionary decisions were reviewed under the abuse-of-discretion 
standard and legal conclusions were reviewed de novo.27 However, in 
1996, Congress passed two amendments to the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (“INA”): the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 
Act (“AEDPA”) and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”).28 Together the amendments bar federal 
review of most discretionary decisions and crime-related removal 
orders.29 Further, in 2005 the REAL ID Act eliminated habeas corpus 
review.30 These restrictions are problematic because the vast majority of 
noncitizens in removal proceedings apply for discretionary relief31 and 
often the distinction between a legal question about a statute (which is 
reviewable under the amendments) and discretionary use of power 
granted in accordance with a statute (which is not reviewable) is 
unclear.32 Today, asylum is the only discretionary issue that is 
reviewable by the federal courts of appeals.33 What is more, the 
amendments created a complex layering of procedural rules and 
exceptions and, as a result, the federal courts of appeals have developed 
a “convoluted labyrinth of case law construing the exceptions,” which 
some argue waste the noncitizen and the court’s time and money.34  
If a case is fortunate enough make it to the federal courts, the court of 
appeal’s ability to review the case is limited. By stripping habeas corpus 
jurisdiction and restricting remand, Congress has virtually eliminated 
the court of appeal’s ability to order fact finding.35 Indeed, when 
reviewing BIA decisions, the federal courts of appeals must decide 
“only on the administrative record.”36 According to the INA, “[t]he 
administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable 
adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.”37 The 
inability to remand for further fact finding is particularly problematic in 
asylum and torture cases because country conditions can change rapidly 
so by the time the case reaches the court of appeals three to four years 
after the case began the administrative record can be vastly inaccurate.38 
 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 4-3. 
 29. Legomsky, supra note 3, at 1696. 
 30. JUDICIAL REVIEW BY CIRCUIT COURTS, supra note 6, at 4-8. 
 31. Legomsky, supra note 3, at 1696. 
 32. JUDICIAL REVIEW BY CIRCUIT COURTS, supra note 6, at 4-10. 
 33. Id. at 4-9. 
 34. Id. at 4-3. 
 35. Id. at 4-12. Lendo v. Gonzales, 493 F.3d 439, 443 n.3 (4th Cir. 2007), Gebremaria v. 
Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 734, 737 (8th Cir. 2004), and Wan Ping Lin v. Mukasey, 303 Fed. Appx. 465, 468 
(9th Cir. 2008) are all examples of cases where the court of appeals noted that the outcome would have 
been different if they could remand for further fact-findings. 
 36. 8 U.S.C. §1252(b)(4)(A) (2017). 
 37. 8 U.S.C. §1252(b)(4)(B) (2017). 
 38. JUDICIAL REVIEW BY CIRCUIT COURTS, supra note 6, at 4-15. To deal with this problem 
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Furthermore, unlike appeal to the BIA, appeal to the courts of appeals 
does not stay removal orders, so a noncitizen can be removed while 
appeal is pending.39 After reviewing the BIA decision, the courts of 
appeals may remand the case to the BIA with instructions or can reject 
the BIA ruling, which has resulted in a several circuit splits.40 
B. Problems with the Immigration Courts and the BIA 
The first problem with the immigration adjudication system is that the 
current scheme exacerbates the already inherently difficult nature of 
immigration cases. Immigration cases are fact intensive41 and, in asylum 
cases, courts are often unable to ascertain the facts with certainty and 
must rely on the asylum seeker’s testimony.42 However, the noncitizen 
may not be able to communicate well due to language barriers and 
inexperience with the law.43 Judges often have to work with translators 
and must go over the facts several times to make sure the judge 
understands the noncitizen’s testimony.44 These inherent difficulties are 
made worse by immigration law’s often-ambiguous legal standards45 
and the noncitizen’s pro se status.46 In addition to ascertaining what 
happened in the past, an asylum decision requires the judge to predict 
what would happen if the asylum seeker were deported.47 Immigration 
judges must use their speculations about the past and future to make a 
life-altering dichotomous decision: the judge either orders removal or 
does not.48 In our present system, these are the only two options and the 
judge does not have an opportunity to reconsider the decision once the 
noncitizen is deported.49  
 When a judge struggles to determine an accurate legal conclusion, the 
judges’ preferences are more likely to affect the final decision.50 
Currently, there are sharp disparities in the rate individual immigration 
 
some courts of appeals take judicial notice but this option is restricted by the Rules of Evidence, 
therefore a legislative solution that restores the authority to remand is preferable. Id. at 16. 
 39. Legomsky, supra note 3, at 1643. 
 40. Birdsong, supra note 13, at 26. 
 41. E.g., Legomsky, supra note 3, at 1654; Russell R. Wheeler, Fortieth Annual Administrative 
Law Issue: Immigration Law and Adjudication: Practical Impediments to Structural Reform and the 
Promise of Third Branch Analytic Methods: A Reply to Professors Baum and Legomsky, 59 DUKE L. J. 
1847, 1858 (2010).   
 42. Baum, supra note 21, at 1510. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Legomsky, supra note 3, at 1654. 
 45. Baum, supra note 21, at 1509. 
 46. Id. at 1510.  
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 1511. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Baum, supra note 21, at 1511. 
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judges grant asylum.51 According to one study, a Colombian asylum 
applicant who appears before the immigration court in Miami has a five 
percent chance of being granted asylum under one judge and an eighty-
eight percent chance of being granted asylum before another judge in 
the same court.52    
In their Asylum Study, Professors Ramji-Nogales, Schoenholtz, and 
Schrag of Georgetown Law School found three variables that impact the 
rate at which judges grant asylum.53 First, whether the asylum seeker has 
legal counsel is the single most important factor affecting the outcome 
of the asylum seeker’s case.54 Under the INA, noncitizens may obtain 
representation “at no expense to the government”55 but they do not have 
a Sixth Amendment right to counsel.56 Noncitizens can only get court 
appointed counsel if they prove assistance is necessary to provide 
“fundamental fairness.”57 This high standard has led to the denial of 
court appointed counsel in all published cases so far.58 As a result, the 
overwhelming majority of noncitizens are not represented.59  
Second, the immigration judge’s gender significantly impacts the rate 
the judge grants asylum.60 Female judges grant asylum 53.8% of the 
time, while their male colleagues grant asylum at a rate of only 37.3%.61 
This disparity may be because female judges are less apt to have 
immigration enforcement backgrounds.62 Most male immigration judges 
served as trial attorneys prosecuting immigration cases for the DHS or 
the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”).63 The more 
time the judge worked for the DHS or INS the more likely the judge’s 
decisions favor the U.S.64 This is because lawyers who work in 
immigration enforcement are trained to develop a “law enforcement 
mindset” and deny entrance or order deportation when the lawyer doubts 
the validity of the noncitizen’s claim.65 
 
 51. REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM, supra note 8, at 27. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew I. Schoenholtz, & Philip G. Schrag, Refugee Roulette: 
Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295, 340-42 (2007) [hereinafter Asylum Study]. 
 54. Id. at 340. 
 55. 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (2017). 
 56. See REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM, supra note 8, at 40. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. E.g., Dana Leigh Marks, Let Immigration Judges be judges, THE HILL CONGRESS BLOG 
(May 9, 2013, 8:03 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/judicial/298875-let-immigration-judges-
be-judges. 
 60. Asylum Study, supra note 53, at 342. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Birdsong, supra note 13, at 33. 
 63. See Baum, supra note 21, at 1529.  
 64. Id. 
 65. Birdsong, supra note 13, at 34. 
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Last, Asylum Study found that asylum applicants with dependents are 
more likely to be granted asylum.66  
 A further problem with the current immigration adjudication system 
is its mounting backlog.67 From 2013 to 2016, the surge at the U.S.-
Mexico border increased the immigration docket by forty-six percent.68 
In January 2016, the immigration court’s docket had 475,000 cases 
divided among 250 judges.69 Cases pending before certain judges in 
2016 were scheduled for 2023.70 As of October 2016, the BIA’s docket 
has over 34,000 cases.71  
This backlog is a consequence of amplified immigration enforcement. 
In recent years, the DHS has increased apprehending and removing all 
criminal noncitizens as well as issuing notices to appear to noncitizens 
clearly eligible for benefits but who are “out of status.”72 While 
Congress allocated additional funds to implement these growing 
enforcement measures, it did not allocate the resources necessary to 
adjudicate the resulting cases.73 Only recently, under the Trump 
administration, has there been an increase in immigration judges.74 In 
addition to inadequate funding, immigration courts have inadequate 
support staff.75  On average, there is one clerk for every four 
immigration judges and immigration judges do not have bailiffs.76 
Moreover, the growing number of proceedings pending before the 
immigration courts has created a massive immigrant detention system 
that is costly and difficult to manage.77 
In the face of this backlog, simply processing cases can become many 
judges’ primary goal.78 Judges with heavy caseloads often adopt 
strategies to process decisions, such as a preference to affirm the lower 
court (which also made its decision under great pressure).79 
Furthermore, the BIA is incentivized to affirm cases because 
affirmations do not require written opinions and reversals do.80  
 
 66. Asylum Study, supra note 53, at 341. 
 67. Poarch, supra note 18, at 10. 
 68. Id. at 11. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM, supra note 8, at 20. 
 73. Tara Lundstrom, Lasting Lessons from the Border Surge: It’s Time We Fund an Independent 
Immigration Court System, FED. LAW., Jan.-Feb. 2015, at 3. 
 74. Mica Rosenberg & Kristina Cooke, Immigration judges exempt from Trump's federal hiring 
freeze, REUTERS, March 3, 2017. 
 75. E.g., Legomsky, supra note 3, at 1652. 
 76. Id. 
 77. REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM, supra note 8, at 25. 
 78. Baum, supra note 21, at 1518. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 1519. 
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The enormous caseload and the inherent difficultly of immigration 
cases causes immigration judges to burnout quickly.81 One practicing 
attorney, explains: 
 
[O]ur immigration laws are comparable in complexity to our tax 
laws. Immigration judges . . . . are responsible for knowing the 
political, social, and economic conditions in countries spanning the 
globe . . . . They must do this while hearing cases for 36 hours per 
week from the bench and with only a fraction of a law clerk’s time. 
And the nature of their work—listening to heart-wrenching stories 
of persecution and torture every day—takes its toll . . . .82  
 
Despite the seriousness of the aforementioned problems, the Attorney 
General’s control over immigration adjudication is by far the most 
concerning characteristic of the system. Both the immigration judges 
and the BIA members are directly under the Attorney General’s 
control.83 Before 1983, immigration courts and the BIA were part of the 
INS.84 In 1983, in an effort to remove the immigration courts and the 
BIA from immigration enforcement, the courts were placed in the newly 
created Executive Office of Immigration Review (“EOIR”).85 While this 
restructuring insulates the adjudicators from the INS, both bodies remain 
in the DOJ, which answers to the Attorney General.86 
The Attorney General exerts pervasive power over immigration 
judges. The Attorney General can directly appoint immigration judges.87 
Once hired, the judges are considered DOJ staff attorneys with a duty of 
loyalty to the DOJ.88 The immigration judges do not have fixed terms 
and, since they lack protection against removal without cause, they are 
subject to discretionary removal by the Attorney General.89 As a result, 
the immigration judges can potentially serve a life term or be removed 
because the Attorney General does not agree with their decisions.90  
Similarly, BIA members are appointed by the Attorney General and 
serve under his or her discretion.91 BIA decisions may be reviewed de 
novo by the Attorney General, who may vacate or substitute the BIA 
 
 81. Legomsky, supra note 3, at 1655. 
 82. Lundstrom, supra note 73, at 4. 
 83. E.g., REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM, supra note 8, at 27, 34. 
 84. Birdsong, supra note 13, at 29. 
 85. Legomsky, supra note 3, at 1667. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Birdsong, supra note 13, at 29. 
 88. REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM, supra note 8, at 44. 
 89. Id. at 29. 
 90. Id. at 29-30. 
 91. Id. at 34. 
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decisions for his or her own.92 Due to this oversight, the Attorney 
General can politicize the BIA by directly firing members or indirectly 
threatening to reverse their opinions.93 One practicing immigration 
attorney declared, “[i]f one draws the curtain back on first impressions, 
the attorney general sits as the great and powerful Oz at the helm of the 
entire judicial enterprise.”94  
The Attorney General’s control over the immigration judges and the 
BIA has resulted in several political scandals in recent years. During an 
investigation of the hiring process of immigration courts, Monica 
Goodling, principal deputy director of public affairs under Attorney 
General Ashcroft, confirmed that the immigration judges hired between 
2004-2006 were appointed based on their conservative political views.95 
In response to the scandal and circuit criticism, the Attorney General 
issued a twenty-two-point plan to improve the immigration courts.96 
Fifteen of the twenty-two reforms were enacted including some funding 
to hire additional judges and support staff, the installation of digital 
recording in the courts, and training for all immigration judges.97  
In 1999 and 2002, in response to the BIA’s mounting backlog, the 
Attorney General implemented a series of BIA reforms.98 In 2002, the 
BIA’s standard of review was changed: the BIA could no longer 
conduct de novo review of the facts but instead had to review facts 
under the “clearly erroneous” standard.99 This standard inhibits the 
BIA’s ability to correct mistakes made by the immigration judges 
(which are increasingly difficult to avoid given the judge’s crushing 
caseload) and obstructs their ability to check against disparities between 
individual immigration judges.100 
Additionally, prior to 1999, cases before the BIA were heard by a 
minimum of three members.101 In 1999, a single member of the BIA was 
empowered to review decisions and issue Affirmances Without 
Opinions (“AWO”s)102 in a limited category of cases.103 In 2002, this 
category was greatly expanded.104 Today, the vast majority of cases 
 
 92. Id. 
 93. REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM, supra note 8, at 34. 
 94. Poarch, supra note 18, at 11. 
 95. Legomsky, supra note 3, at 1665-66. 
 96. Birdsong, supra note 13, at 37. 
 97. Id. at 37-38. 
 98. REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM, supra note 8, at 31. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 32. 
 101. Id. at 31. 
 102. AWOs are final decisions to affirm the immigration judge that are not accompanied by a 
written opinion.  
 103. REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM, supra note 8, at 31. 
 104. See id. at 31-32. 
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before the BIA are reviewed by single-members105 and many final 
decisions are either AWOs or short, cursory opinions.106 Single-member 
review results in less precedent (single-member decisions are not 
precedential), precludes dissent and the interplay of legal minds, and 
renders the BIA less likely to catch errors by the immigration courts.107 
Further, the lack of detailed reasoning denies the noncitizen and his or 
her counsel a sufficient explanation for the BIA decision.108 As a result, 
noncitizens have less confidence in the BIA rulings and are more likely 
to appeal to the federal courts of appeals.109 In fact, it is widely observed 
that the number of immigration appeals to the federal courts has 
dramatically increased since 2002.110 For example, in 2008, thirty 
percent of the BIA’s decisions were appealed and comprise seventeen 
percent of circuit courts’ caseload.111 This increase in appeals 
particularly burdens the Ninth and Second Circuits.112 
Perhaps the most controversial 2002 reform was Attorney General 
Ashcroft’s decision to reduce the BIA from twenty-three to eleven 
members, even though the stated purpose of the 2002 reforms was to 
alleviate the BIA’s massive backlog.113 The decision to remove twelve 
current BIA members was unprecedented; in the BIA’s sixty-three-year 
history, the Attorney General had never removed a BIA member.114 
After the Attorney General announced his decision to reduce the number 
of BIA members, but before declaring which member would be let go, 
the BIA members, fearing for their job security, rendered more decisions 
that favored the U.S.115 Their fears were not unfounded; the twelve BIA 
members who were eventually terminated ruled in favor of noncitizens 
more frequently.116 The number of BIA members subsequently 
increased and, currently, the BIA has seventeen members.117 The 2002 
change in the BIA membership illustrates the extensive power the 
Attorney General exerts over the BIA and the effect of that power – 
pressure to rule according to the Attorney General’s political agenda and 
termination when members do not succumb to this pressure.   
 
 105. Legomsky, supra note 3, at 1657. 
 106. REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM, supra note 8, at 32. 
 107. E.g., REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM, supra note 8, at 32; Legomsky, supra note 
3, at 1664. 
 108. REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM, supra note 8, at 32. 
 109. JUDICIAL REVIEW BY CIRCUIT COURTS, supra note 6, at 4-18. 
 110. Id. at 4-17. 
 111. Legomsky, supra note 3, at 1646. 
 112. E.g., JUDICIAL REVIEW BY CIRCUIT COURTS, supra note 6, at 4-18. 
 113. E.g., Legomsky, supra note 3, at 1668. 
 114. Id. at 1669. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Poarch, supra note 18, at 10. 
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In light of the above-mentioned issues, countless judges, attorneys, 
and academics advocate converting the immigration courts and the BIA 
into legislative courts.118 To evaluate this proposal, this comment first 
explores the constitutionality of legislative courts. 
C. The Constitutionality of Article I 
Article I courts, or legislative courts, are tribunals created by 
Congress that are not staffed with Article III judges.119 Congress has the 
power to make legislative courts under Article I, Section 8, Clause 9 of 
the Constitution.120 Unlike Article III judges, legislative judges are not 
necessarily nominated by the President and approved by the Senate, do 
not have lifetime tenure, and do not have Article III salary protection.121 
Examples of legislative judges include tax court judges122 and 
bankruptcy court judges.123  
Traditionally, there were three permissible Article I courts: territorial 
courts, military courts, and courts that adjudicate “public rights” 
disputes.124 The “public rights” exception was created in Murray’s 
Lessee125 and permits Congress to create legislative courts to adjudicate 
public rights, which were originally defined as disputes between a party 
and the government.126 When deciding the constitutionality of Article I 
courts, the Supreme Court oscillates between a formulistic approach, 
which advocates for bright line rules,127 and a functionalistic approach, 
which focuses on utility and often employs balancing tests.128  
In Northern Pipeline, Justice Brennan’s plurality opinion adopted a 
formulistic approach and held that, to fall within the public rights 
exception, the U.S. must be a party in the suit.129 Consequently, the 
 
 118. E.g., REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM, supra note 8, at 9; Marks, supra note 59; 
Lundstrom, supra note 73, at 5; Poarch, supra note 18, at 10. 
 119. MOORE’S MANUAL: FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §1.03 (2016). 
 120. U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 9. 
 121. MOORE’S MANUAL: FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §1.03 (2016). The Article III 
salary protections guarantee that Article III judges’ salaries cannot be diminished. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Com. v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 853 (1986).    
 124. Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 585 (1985).   
 125. N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 67 (1982).    
 126. Id. at 67-68. 
 127. See id. 
 128. See Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986). 
 129. N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 67-68. The formalist and functionalist approaches are not necessarily 
sealed from one another; in Northern Pipeline the Court used the two approaches in the same decision. 
Justice Brennan pointed out functionalistic reasons why the Bankruptcy Courts were unconstitutional 
including the fact that the Bankruptcy Courts had the power to enter final judgments and, while appeal 
to a federal district court was possible, the standard of review upon appeal was “clearly erroneous,” a 
highly deferential standard. Id. at 85-86. 
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bankruptcy judges serving under the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 did not fall 
under the public rights exception because the U.S. is not a party in 
bankruptcy disputes.130 
Justice White dissented in Northern Pipeline and upheld that 
bankruptcy courts employing a functionalist balancing test, which 
included the following factors: (1) the availability of appellate review to 
an Article III court;131 (2) the extent to which the Article I court would 
undermine the authority of Article III courts;132 and (3) Congress’ 
justifications for creating the Article I court.133  
Thereafter, Justice O’Connor embraced Justice White’s formulistic 
approach in her majority opinions in Thomas v. Union Carbide and 
Commodities Futures Trading Commission v. Schor.134 The dispute in 
Thomas involved a data-sharing arrangement between pesticide 
companies under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide 
Act (“FIFRA”), which required all disputes about compensation 
between pesticide companies be decided in binding arbitration with a 
legislative judge.135 The Court held that the Article I court was 
constitutional under the balancing approach because it had elements of 
public and private rights.136 While the case did not meet the Northern 
Pipeline’s public right exception (for the U.S. was not party in the 
dispute), it was not purely a private right because it arose under a 
complex regulatory scheme that did not exist at common law.137 
O’Connor balanced the three factors found in White’s dissent and found 
that all weighed in favor of upholding the statutory scheme.138  
O’Connor further developed her functionalist approach by 
 
 130. Id. at 71. 
 131. N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. 50, 100 (1982).    
 132. Id. at 103. 
 133. See id. at 117. Applying these factors Justice White upheld the bankruptcy Courts because 
(1) the Bankruptcy Act provided appellate review to an Article III court, id. at 100; (2) the bankruptcy 
judges would not encroach on power of Article III judges since Article III judges would still hear the 
vast majority of cases, id. at 103; and (3) the bankruptcy courts provided more efficient adjudication and 
were specialty courts, which allowed the judges to adequately specialize in the complex area of law, id. 
at 117. 
 134. See Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568 (1985); see also Schor, 478 
U.S. 833 (1986).  
 135. Thomas, 473 U.S. at 571-73. 
 136. Id. at 589. 
 137. Id. 
 138. (1) FIFRA provided appellate review to an Article III court, id. at 592; (2) the dispute 
involved a complex regulatory scheme that would not exist absent the statute, id. at 589.; and (3) the 
complex regulatory scheme was logical and fair, id. at 590. The scheme was fair because it set a fee for 
using the information from another company to compensate that company. Id. Disputes between 
companies were resolved through arbitration, which takes the case out of the public eyes thereby 
shielding companies that deal with products that could danger public health if dealt with improperly. See 
id. Moreover, the arbitrators were independent federal agents so the decision makers were free from 
political influence. Id. 
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enumerating a five-part factor test in Schor. In that case, Schor and 
Mortgage Services of America brought a claim for reparations against 
their broker, ContiCommodity Services, Inc., before a non-Article III 
judge in accordance with the Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
(“CFTC”).139 ContiCommodity counterclaimed for nonpayment.140 To 
determine whether the non-Article III judge could hear the counterclaim, 
O'Connor laid out a balancing test that considered the following factors: 
(1) the origins and importance of the right that is being adjudicated; (2) 
the extent to which the legislative court exercises the range of 
jurisdiction and powers normally vested in Article III courts; (3) the 
extent to which the essential attributes of judicial power are reserved for 
Article III courts; (4) the ability of an Article III court to hear the case; 
and (5) Congress’s reasons for departing from adjudication in an Article 
III court.141 Applying this test, the Court determined that the 
adjudication of the counterclaim did not violate Article III.142 Even 
under this balancing approach, the majority did not discount the 
distinction between public and private rights, but held that it was one 
among many factors courts should consider.143 
Most recently, in Stern v. Marshall, the Supreme Court adopted a 
more formulistic approach and distinguished, but did not overrule, 
Thomas and Schor. In Stern, the Court was asked whether the 
bankruptcy court could hear a tort counterclaim.144 The Supreme Court 
focused on the public and private rights dichotomy and held that the 
bankruptcy court could not hear the counterclaim because it was a state 
law action between two private parties.145 The Court distinguished the 
counterclaim from the preceding cases.146 Unlike the claim in Thomas, 
the counterclaim did not flow from a complex statutory scheme.147 
Unlike Schor, the counterclaim did not depend on the adjudication of a 
 
 139. Schor, 478 U.S. at 837.  
 140. Id. at 838. 
 141. Id. at 851. 
 142. (1) The counterclaim existed at common law, id. at 852; (2) CFTC tribunal only reviewed a 
particular area of law, id.; (3) the parties themselves chose to go to the non-Article III court, id. at 849; 
(4) Article III courts can review CFTC decisions under a highly deferential standard of review, id. at 
853; and (5) the counterclaim jurisdiction was necessary to create a workable framework, id. at 855. 
 143. See id. at 853-54. 
 144. J. Howard did not include Vickie Lynn Marshall (Anna Nichole Smith) in his will even 
though they married a year before his death. Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S 462, 470 (2011). Peirce, 
Howard’s son, filed a complaint in the bankruptcy Court for defamation and Vickie filed a counterclaim 
for tortious interference with a gift. Id. The bankruptcy court awarded Vickie $400 million in 
compensatory damages and $25 million in punitive damages. Id. at 470-71. Pierce appealed arguing that 
Vickie’s counterclaim was outside the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction. Id. at 471. 
 145. Id. at 488. 
 146. Id. at 493. 
 147. Id. 
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claim created by federal law.148 The Court stated that even though it was 
more efficient to hear the counterclaim in the bankruptcy court, 
efficiency was not the only factor.149 Despite this formalistic holding, 
the Supreme Court decision also had functionalistic aspects. For 
example, the Court acknowledged that the bankruptcy judges had 
limited power150 and parties could appeal to an Article III court,151 but, 
the standard of review was deferential to the bankruptcy court.152 
Since many demands for immigration court reform call for an Article 
I court with a trial and appellate division,153 it is beneficial to examine 
the structure of U.S. bankruptcy courts, which includes an optional 
appellate-level tribunal. 
D. U.S. Bankruptcy Court 
The U.S. bankruptcy courts were established in 1898.154 Nearly 100 
years later, in 1978, Congress converted the bankruptcy courts into 
Article I courts and invited each circuit to establish a Bankruptcy 
Appellate Panel (“BAP”),155 a panel of three bankruptcy judges that hear 
appeals from the bankruptcy courts.156 In addition, the Bankruptcy 
Reform Act of 1978 expanded bankruptcy court jurisdiction while 
simultaneously limiting federal court review, which led to Northern 
Pipeline.157 As discussed above, in Northern Pipeline the Supreme 
Court held that the jurisdiction provision of the 1978 Act 
unconstitutionally granted non-Article III judges too much judicial 
authority.158 In response, the Judicial Conference of the U.S. passed the 
Emergency Model Rule (“Rule”), which subjected the bankruptcy 
judges’ factual and legal findings to de novo review in the district 
courts.159 The Rule, however, did not mention the legality of BAPs.160 
The First Circuit found that the Rule implicitly withdrew the BAP’s 
 
 148. Id. 
 149. Stern, 564 U.S at 501. 
 150. Id. at 475. 
 151. Id. at 502. 
 152. Id. 
 153. E.g., REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM, supra note 8, at 9; Marks, supra note 59; 
Lundstrom, supra note 73, at 5; Poarch, supra note 18, at 10. 
 154. Judith A. McKenna & Elizabeth C. Wiggins, Alternative Structures for Bankruptcy Appeals, 
76 AM. BANKR. L. J. 625, 637-38 (2002).  
 155. Id. at 63. 
 156. COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, ¶ 5.02 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed). 
 157. Tisha Morris, The Establishment of Bankruptcy Appellate Panels Under the Bankruptcy 
Reform Act of 1994: Historical Background and Sixth Circuit Analysis, 26 U. MEM. L. REV. 1501, 1503 
(1996).   
 158. Id. at 1504. 
 159. McKenna & Wiggins, supra note 154, at 641. 
 160. Id. 
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authority to hear appeals,161 while the Ninth Circuit held that the Rule 
did not affect the BAP.162  
Two years after Northern Pipeline, Congress passed the Bankruptcy 
Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, which increased 
district court control by specifying that bankruptcy courts were units of 
the district courts and their judges were judicial officers of the district 
courts.163 The 1984 Amendments allowed circuits to establish BAPs 
subject to the following changes: once a circuit established a BAP, each 
district court in the circuit had to authorize appeals to the BAP from that 
district; all parties had to consent to BAP review; and the BAPs could 
only hear noncore (or non-bankruptcy) appeals if the parties permitted 
the bankruptcy judge to enter a final judgment on the noncore claims.164 
In 1994, spawned by the Ninth Circuit’s success in reducing the 
federal courts’ workloads, BAPs became mandatory.165 The Bankruptcy 
Act of 1994 directed judicial councils of each circuit to establish a BAP 
unless the council determined that the circuit had insufficient judicial 
resources or establishing a BAP would cause undue delay.166 
Subsequently, five circuits established a BAP.167 Today, the First, Sixth, 
Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits all have BAPs.168 
BAPs are celebrated for reducing federal court workload and 
providing a specialized perspective, which produces higher quality 
decisions that are less likely to be reversed than the district court 
decision.169 Further, due to the BAP’s specialization, attorneys have 
greater confidence in their opinions and thus make fewer appeals.170 
But, BAPs come at a price: BAPs require additional administrative 
costs171 and, since BAP adjudicators are current bankruptcy judges, 
 
 161. Massachusetts Dep’t Pub. Welfare  v. Dartmouth House Nursing Home, Inc., 726 F.2d 26, 
30 (1st Cir. 1984). 
 162. In re Burley, 738 F.2d 981, 986 (9th Cir. 1984). 
 163. Morris, supra note 157, at 1507.  
 164. Id. at 1507-08. The 1984 amendments distinguished between core and noncore proceedings. 
In core proceedings the bankruptcy judge could issue a final order subject to traditional appellate review 
in the district court or the BAP. In noncore proceedings, the bankruptcy judge could only submit 
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law subject to de novo review in the district courts (or the 
parties could appeal noncore proceedings to the BAP if they consented to the bankruptcy judge entering 
a final order, as stated above). McKenna & Wiggins, supra note 154, at 641-42. 
 165. Morris, supra note 157, at 1508-09. 
 166. McKenna & Wiggins, supra note 154, at 644. 
 167. Id. 
 168. COLLIER, supra note 156, at ¶ 5.02. The BAPs hear cases from some or all of the districts in 
the circuit, depending on the circuit. Id. In districts that have agreed to BAP review, litigants have three 
routes to appeal orders from bankruptcy judges, the parties may appeal: to the district courts, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 158(a) (2017); to the BAP (if the parties consent), 28 U.S.C. § 158(b); or directly to the courts of 
appeals in limited circumstances, 28 U.S.C. § 158(d). 
 169. Morris, supra note 157, at 1517-20.  
 170. Id. at 1519. 
 171. Id. at 1520-21. 
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BAPs increase bankruptcy judges’ workloads.172  
III. ANALYSIS 
Numerous judges, attorneys, academics, and legal institutions urge 
Congress to convert the immigration courts and the BIA into Article I 
courts.173 Congress has the power to do this because immigration cases 
clearly fall within the public rights exception, as the U.S. is a party in all 
immigration proceedings.174 Nonetheless, Stern makes clear that the 
public rights exception, while important, is not the only consideration in 
assessing the constitutionality of a legislative court. Therefore, the 
remainder of this comment argues that Congress should look to the line 
of Supreme Court decisions beginning with Northern Pipeline when 
determining how to structure Article I immigration courts. Part A 
contends that Congress should create legislative immigration courts that, 
like bankruptcy courts, have a trial and appellate division. Part B applies 
the Northern Pipeline line of decisions and asserts, first, that the 
availability of review by federal courts should be expanded and, second, 
that the standard of review in federal court should be less deferential to 
the immigration courts. 
A. Article I Immigration Courts with Trial and Appellate Divisions 
The ABA,175 the Federal Bar Association,176 and the National 
Association of Immigration Judges177 all advocate that immigration 
courts and the BIA be converted into legislative courts. This structural 
change is needed to give immigrant adjudicators the job security they 
need to make decisions based on law and fact rather than on the 
outcome that pleases the current Attorney General.178 Dana Leigh 
Marks, the president of the National Association of Immigration Judges 
explained, “[w]hile seemingly technical, this change is essential to 
achieve the most fundamental expectation we American’s hold about 
judges: that they are independent and protected from undue influence by 
any party to their proceedings.”179  
 
 172. Id. at 1521-23. 
 173. E.g., REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM, supra note 8, at 9; Marks, supra note 59; 
Lundstrom, supra note 73, at 5; Poarch, supra note 18, at 10. 
 174. Immigration was listed in Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51 (1932) as a familiar example 
of a public right. 
 175. REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM, supra note 8, at 9. 
 176. Lundstrom, supra note 73, at 5. 
 177. Marks, supra note 59. 
 178. See Legomsky, supra note 3, at 1691. 
 179. Marks, supra note 59. 
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As a preliminary matter, immigration court structural reform is 
admittedly unlikely in the current political climate. In the late 1990s, 
Congress considered and rejected three bills to establish Article I 
immigration courts.180 Currently, Congress is not likely to create Article 
I immigration courts for two reasons. First, Congress lacks the political 
will to create legislative courts because many representatives believe 
restructuring the immigration courts and the BIA would require 
additional funding.181 Second, and more importantly, the Attorney 
General and administrative state does not want to relinquish its power 
over the immigration adjudication system.182 Nevertheless, while 
converting the immigration courts and the BIA into Article I courts is 
improbable at present, “[i]t is beneficial to churn ideas and be ready 
should an opportunity arise.”183   
Some argue that converting the immigration adjudicators into 
administrative law judges (“ALJs”) is more realistic in our political 
climate.184 Advocates of this reform point out that even though, as ALJs, 
the immigration adjudicators would be housed in the executive branch, 
they would be further removed from executive control than they are in 
the present structure.185 Yet, as discussed above, subjecting immigration 
adjudicators to executive control, even if diminished, is highly 
problematic. Even proponents of this reform recognize that ALJs are 
under the Attorney General’s control and subject to his or her political 
whims.186 Thus, to ensure sufficient independence from the executive 
branch, Congress must establish legislative immigration courts. 
The Article I immigration courts should include a trial and appellate 
division. One may argue that Article I courts traditionally do not have 
appellate divisions so a two-tiered Article I immigration court would be 
inappropriate. Yet, as aforementioned, the BAPs are an exception to this 
general rule. Furthermore, BAPs have proven to be an efficient means of 
reducing the federal court workload and producing high quality 
decisions.187 Moreover, the legislative preference to make a BAP is so 
strong that, if a circuit council finds that the circuit need not create a 
BAP because one of the two statutory exceptions are satisfied 
(insufficient resources or undue delay), the council must submit a report 
 
 180. Birdsong, supra note 13, at 44. 
 181. Id. at 46. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Wheeler, supra note 41, at 1848. 
 184. Id. at 1868. 
 185. See id. at 1869. 
 186. Id.  
 187. Morris, supra note 157, at 1517-20. In fact, Judge James Browning, the former chief judge of 
the Ninth Circuit, recounts that the benefits of establishing an appellate-level bankruptcy court were so 
evident that when the opportunity to create a BAP came along “it seemed to [him] there was no choice.” 
Id. at 1517. 
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to the Judicial Conference of the U.S. explaining its findings.188 The 
Judicial Conference has the power to overrule the circuit council.189  
The legislative immigration courts would benefit from a trial and 
appellate division because immigration, like bankruptcy, is a high-
volume court. In 2016, 1,131,341 cases were pending before the 
bankruptcy courts190 and, as stated, in January 2016, the immigration 
courts had 475,000 cases on their dockets.191 While the immigration 
courts have smaller dockets, as above-mentioned, immigration cases are 
inherently difficult both in the complexity of the laws and the intricacies 
of the facts. Plus, most noncitizens require translators, which doubles 
the time necessary to process the noncitizens in court. As a result, unlike 
bankruptcy, Congress should permit appeal to the Article I immigration 
court(s)192 in every case. 
One may point out that BAP review is optional – circuits do not have 
to create a BAP and even if a circuit establishes a BAP each district 
court in the circuit must approve the BAP and the parties must consent 
to BAP review – and, thus, review by the Article I immigration appellate 
court should also be optional. However, one must remember that 
Congress established the above options to ensure the BAP’s 
constitutionality, which was called into question after Northern Pipeline. 
In Northern Pipeline, the Supreme Court made clear that, since the U.S. 
is not a party in bankruptcy proceedings, bankruptcy does not fall within 
the traditional public rights exception.193 After Northern Pipeline, 
Congress gave federal courts greater control over the bankruptcy 
proceedings, such as by making BAP review optional, to ensure the 
bankruptcy courts’ constitutionality.194 Immigration, on the other hand, 
clearly falls within this traditional public rights exception because the 
U.S. is a party in the suit. Therefore, Congress does not have to make 
review to the appellate-level Article I court optional.   
Professor Legomsky contends that having two rounds of appellate 
review, one by an Article I immigration court and another by a federal 
court, is duplicative195 and costly.196 Yet, this criticism is misguided. 
First, removing the immigration courts and the BIA from the executive 
 
 188. COLLIER, supra note 156, at ¶ 5.02. 
 189. Id. 
 190. UNITED STATES COURTS, U.S. BANKRUPTCY COURTS—BANKRUPTCY CASES COMMENCED, 
TERMINATED, AND PENDING DURING THE 12-MONTH PERIODS ENDING DECEMBER 31, 2015 AND 2016, 
Table F, http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/bf_f_1231.2016.pdf.  
 191. Poarch, supra note 18, at 11. 
 192. Determining the necessary number of immigration trial and appellate courts is beyond the 
scope of this comment.  
 193. N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 71 (1982).   
 194. See Morris, supra note 157, at 1507. 
 195. Legomsky, supra note 3, at 1680. 
 196. Id. at 1696. 
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branch would increase their independence, which would lead to greater 
confidence in their decisions, and, in turn, would lead to fewer appeals 
to the federal courts.197 Second, the dual round of appeals would be 
beneficial for the cases that would nonetheless appeal to the federal 
courts. Third, immigration appellate judges would provide their 
specialized understanding of the complexities of immigration law and 
the federal, generalist judges would serve as an equitable check on 
abuses of life and liberty.198 
Both specialist and generalist judges offer distinct benefits. 
Specialized judges familiarize themselves with a complex area of law, 
allowing them to work more efficiently, both monetarily and 
temporarily.199 Further, specialist judges reach more consistent 
outcomes200 and repeated exposure to the practical consequences of their 
decisions leads to results that are fair and pragmatic.201 Generalist 
judges, on the other hand, can draw guidance and analogies from other 
areas of law and are able to approach cases with less-engrained 
biases.202 This well-rounded perspective is particularly important in 
immigration cases that deal with the restriction of personal liberty and 
human rights.203 
One may contend that some issues are inherently challenging, 
regardless of the adjudicator’s level of expertise;204 since immigration 
cases are innately difficult, two rounds of review by a specialized judge 
would have limited benefits.205 Yet, this argument is flawed because 
abolishing the appellate-level immigration court would flood the federal 
courts with time-consuming immigration cases. What is more, if 
Congress increased the number of federal judgeships (or created a new 
Article III court to hear immigration appeals as Professor Legomsky 
suggests) in response to this influx of immigration cases,206 this would 
dilute the prestigious status of Article III judges.207  
B. Lessons from Northern Pipeline 
When converting the immigration courts and the BIA to legislative 
courts, Congress should be guided by the Supreme Court line of 
 
 197. See REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM, supra note 8, at 44. 
 198. See JUDICIAL REVIEW BY CIRCUIT COURTS, supra note 6, at 4-20. 
 199. Legomsky, supra note 3, at 1680. 
 200. Id. at 1694. 
 201. Id. at 1693. 
 202. Id. at 1695. 
 203. JUDICIAL REVIEW BY CIRCUIT COURTS, supra note 6, at 4-20. 
 204. Baum, supra note 21, at 1543. 
 205. See id. at 1548. 
 206. Legomsky, supra note 3, at 1640. 
 207. Wheeler, supra note 41, at 1864-65. 
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decisions beginning with Northern Pipeline. As stated, immigration 
clearly falls within the public rights exception because the U.S. is a 
party in all immigration proceedings. Still, the Supreme Court made 
known in Stern that the public/private rights dichotomy is not the only 
factor considered when assessing a legislative court’s constitutionality. 
Consequently, Congress should be mindful of the functional balancing 
approach the Court applied in Thomas and Schor. This balancing 
approach makes clear that, after the public/private rights distinction, one 
of the most important considerations when assessing an Article I court’s 
constitutionality is the availability of federal appellate review and the 
standard of review upon appeal. Accordingly, when Congress changes 
the immigration courts and the BIA into legislative courts, Congress 
should expand the availability of federal court review and enact a less 
deferential standard of review. 
As demonstrated above, a noncitizens’ ability to appeal to an Article 
III court has been greatly restricted in recent years. From a practical 
standpoint, this restriction is problematic because it forecloses federal 
judicial review of all discretionary issues (except decisions to grant 
asylum) and has resulted in a complex layering of rules that waste the 
litigants and courts’ time and resources. Furthermore, Northern Pipeline 
and its prodigies reveal that the federal court’s limited ability to review 
immigration cases is problematic from a constitutional perspective. In 
both Thomas and Schor, the Supreme Court stressed the importance of 
federal judicial review of the Article I courts’ decisions.208 Even Stern, 
with its formalistic focus on the public/private right dichotomy, noted 
the availability of review to an Article III court.209 While the Supreme 
Court did not maintain that appellate review to an Article III court alone 
was sufficient to find a legislative court constitutional, the Court 
articulated that the availability of federal judicial review is a central 
factor in assessing the constitutionality of an Article I court. Thus, to 
ensure that the new Article I immigration courts are constitutional, 
Congress should permit the federal courts of appeals to review all 
discretionary decisions and should empower the federal courts to 
remand immigration cases for further fact finding.210 
Furthermore, the line of decisions following Northern Pipeline made 
known that it was not enough simply to permit review in an Article III 
court. Beginning in Northern Pipeline, the Court pointed out that highly 
deferential standards of review in federal court, such as the Bankruptcy 
 
 208. See Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 592 (1985); see also 
Commodity Futures Trading Com. v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 853 (1986).  
 209. Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 502 (2011).  
 210. REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM, supra note 8, at 12-13. 
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Act of 1978’s abuse of discretion standard, were problematic.211 The 
Court clarified this holding in Schor when it distinguished Northern 
Pipeline and held that the CFTC’s less deferential weight of the 
evidence standard for orders and de novo review of legal determinations 
were constitutional.212 These decisions reveal that, in addition to 
restoring review of discretionary decisions, the standard of review in 
federal court should not be deferential to the legislative courts. 
Therefore, in creating Article I immigration courts, Congress should 
restore the standards of review previously available to federal court 
under their habeas corpus jurisdiction: facts should be reviewed under 
the substantial evidence standard;213 discretionary decisions should be 
reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard;214 and legal 
conclusions should be considered de novo.215  
In addition, as stated, the 1996 Amendments to the INA eliminated 
the federal court of appeal’s ability to remand for further fact finding. 
Even though the Northern Pipeline line of decisions did not speak 
directly to this issue, the decisions stand for the proposition that Article 
III courts should be permitted wide discretion when reviewing Article I 
courts’ decisions. Hence, to ensure the constitutionality of legislative 
immigration courts, Congress should amend the INA to permit the 
courts of appeals to remand cases to the immigration courts for further 
fact finding.216  
One may contend that permitting federal judicial review of all 
discretionary decisions would flood the federal courts of appeals. But, as 
demonstrated above, the present high volume of appeals to the federal 
courts is a result of the perception that the immigration adjudication 
system is unfair.217 Indeed, following the 2002 reforms to the BIA, the 
number of appeals to the federal courts increased dramatically because 
noncitizens and their attorneys lacked confidence in the BIA’s 
decisions.218 If both the trial and appellate immigration court were 
removed from the executive branch,219 litigants would have greater 
confidence in the courts’ decisions and be less likely to appeal to the 
federal courts.  
Finally, while transforming the immigration trial and appellate courts 
 
 211. See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 85 (1982).  
 212. Schor, 478 U.S. at 853. 
 213. See e.g., Paredes-Urrestarazu v. INS, 36 F.3d 801, 807 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 214. See e.g., Bazrafshan v. Pomeroy, 587 F. Supp. 498, 501 (D.N.J. 1984); see also Soroa-
Gonzales v. Civiletti, 515 F. Supp. 1049, 1057 (N.D.Ga. 1981). 
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into legislative courts would vastly improve the immigration 
adjudication system, this change alone would not be enough. It is widely 
recognized that the immigration courts are understaffed.220 Immigration 
court reform must account for this gross deficiency and increase the 
number of judges and support staff accordingly. The ABA’s 2010 
report, Reforming the Immigration System, called for an additional 100 
judges and enough clerks to increase the clerk to judge ratio from one to 
four to one to one.221 Predicting the current judge and staff deficiency is 
beyond the scope of this comment, but given that the number of 
immigration cases has only grown since 2010 with the surge of 
unaccompanied minors,222 it is safe to say that the new Article I 
immigration courts would require at least an additional 100 judgeships. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
A fundamental principle in our constitutional system is that “there is 
no liberty if the power of judging be not separated from the legislative 
and executive powers.”223 Yet, while we condemn judicial comingling 
with the political branches in other areas of law, we tolerate it in the 
immigration adjudication system.224 As a result of this passivity, 
noncitizens are denied their constitutional right to an independent 
adjudicator. To correct this wrong, Congress should establish Article I 
immigration courts with trial and appeal divisions. Further, to comply 
with the Northern Pipeline line of decisions, Congress should empower 
the federal courts to review the Article I courts’ discretionary decisions, 
to remand cases for further fact finding, and to reinstate the less 
deferential standards of review formerly available to federal courts 
under their habeas corpus jurisdiction. While these reforms would not 
solve all of the aforementioned problems, the changes would ensure 
noncitizens independent judicial review, thereby restoring faith in our 
immigration system.  
 
 
 220. E.g., Legomsky, supra note 3, at 1652. 
 221. REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM, supra note 8, at 11. 
 222. E.g., Tom Dart, Child migrants at Texas border: An immigration crisis that’s hardly new, 
THE GUARDIAN (July 9, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/09/us-immigration-
undocumented-children-texas. 
 223. Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 483 (2011) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander 
Hamilton)). 
 224. Poarch, supra note 18, at 10. 
22
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 86, Iss. 3 [2018], Art. 4
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol86/iss3/4
